Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy <p>The&nbsp;<em>Journal of Ethics and&nbsp;Social Philosophy</em>&nbsp;is a peer-reviewed online journal in moral, social, political, and legal philosophy. The journal welcomes submissions of articles in any of these and related fields of research. &nbsp;The journal is interested in work in the history of ethics that bears directly on topics of contemporary interest, but does not consider articles of purely historical interest.</p> <p>The <em>Journal of Ethics and&nbsp;Social Philosophy</em> aspires to be the leading venue for the best new work in the fields that it covers, and applies a correspondingly high editorial standard. &nbsp;But it is the view of the associate editors that this standard does not preclude publishing work that is critical in nature, provided that it is constructive, well-argued, current, and of sufficiently general interest.</p> <p>While the&nbsp;<em>Journal of Ethics and&nbsp;Social Philosophy</em>&nbsp;will consider longer articles, in general the journal would prefer articles that do not exceed 15,000 words, and articles of all lengths will be evaluated in terms of what they accomplish in proportion to their length. Articles under 3k words should be submitted as discussion notes, which are reviewed and published separately from main articles. &nbsp;</p> USC School of Philosophy en-US Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 1559-3061 Can 'More Speech' Counter Ignorant Speech? <p>Ignorant speech, which spreads falsehoods about people and policies, is pervasive in public discourse. A popular response to this problem recommends countering ignorant speech with more speech, rather than legal regulations. However, Mary Kate McGowan has influentially argued that this ‘counterspeech’ response is flawed, as it overlooks the asymmetric pliability of conversational norms: the phenomenon whereby some conversational norms are easier to enact than subsequently to reverse.</p> <p>After demonstrating that this conversational ‘stickiness’ is an even broader concern for counterspeech than McGowan suggests—it applies not just to oppressive or hateful speech, but also to ordinary policy-related misinformation—I argue that a more sophisticated account of counterspeech can nevertheless overcome it.</p> <p>First, the stickiness objection overlooks the distinction between ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ counterspeech. Instead of directly negating a distorted proposition, positive counterspeech affirms a correct proposition that is inconsistent with the falsehoods at hand. This, I contend, allows it to counter ignorant speech without triggering the properties that render it sticky.</p> <p>Second, the stickiness objection presupposes an unrefined conception of counterspeech’s temporality. Counterspeech should be understood as a diachronic process, which not only follows, but also pre-empts, ignorant utterances. Drawing on speech-act theories of silencing, I argue that pre-emptive counterspeech can condition the conversational context so as to prevent subsequent ignorant utterances from enacting sticky conversational norms.</p> <p>Thus, this theoretically-refined conception of counterspeech helps appreciate how verbal responses might overcome the stickiness of conversational norms; and, in doing so, it reveals that this stickiness need not provide reasons to prefer legal remedies to counterspeech.</p> Maxime Charles Lepoutre Copyright (c) 2019 Maxime Charles Lepoutre 2019-10-07 2019-10-07 16 3 10.26556/jesp.v16i3.682 Income Redistribution, Body Part Redistribution, and Respect for the Separateness of Persons <p>This article considers the question of why labor income may be permissibly redistributed to the poor even though non-essential body parts should generally be protected from redistribution to the infirm – the body-income puzzle.&nbsp; It argues that proposed solutions that affirm self-ownership but reject ownership of labor income are unsuccessful.&nbsp; And proposed solutions that grant individuals entitlements to resources based on the centrality of those resources to the individual’s personal identity are also unsuccessful.&nbsp; Instead, this article defends a solution to the body-income puzzle based on a novel conception of respect for the separateness of persons.&nbsp; This conception holds that the sphere of moral authority protected from interference by respect for the separateness of persons includes both the body and labor income.&nbsp; And the strength of the negative rights constituting this sphere vary based on these rights' importance to the personal identity of the right-holder.&nbsp; It is shown that a commitment to helping the disadvantaged tempered by this conception of respect for the separateness of persons can solve the body-income puzzle.</p> Joseph Mazor Copyright (c) 2019 Joseph Mazor 2019-10-07 2019-10-07 16 3 10.26556/jesp.v16i3.385 On Keeping Things in Proportion <div class="page" title="Page 1"> <div class="layoutArea"> <div class="column"> <p>Formula One isn’t very important. You can't care about it too much. The refugee crisis is more important. You can care about it much more. In this paper we investigate how important something is. By ‘importance’ we mean how much it is fitting to care about a thing. We explore a view about this which we call Proportionalism. This view says that a thing’s importance depends on that thing’s share of the world’s total value. The more of what matters there is, the less you can care about each thing in particular. The less of what matters there is, the more you can care about each thing in particular. We argue that, in many respects, Proportionalism is superior to its competitors. It captures some intuitions they leave out and it has a powerful motivation. So, we suggest, you should keep things in proportion.</p> </div> </div> </div> Adam Lovett Stefan Riedener Copyright (c) 2019 Adam Lovett, Stefan Riedener 2019-10-18 2019-10-18 16 3 10.26556/jesp.v16i3.794 Can Streumer Simply Avoid Supervenience? <div class="page" title="Page 1"> <div class="layoutArea"> <div class="column"> <p><span style="font-size: 12.000000pt; font-family: 'TeXGyrePagellaX';">In his defence of an error theory for normative judgements, Bart Streumer presents a new ‘reduction’ argument against non- reductive normative realism. Streumer claims that unlike previous versions, his ‘simple moral theory’ version of the argument does not rely on the supervenience of the normative on the descriptive. But this is incorrect; without supervenience the argument does not succeed. </span></p> </div> </div> </div> Luke Elson Copyright (c) 2019 Luke Elson 2019-10-07 2019-10-07 16 3 10.26556/jesp.v16i3.508