Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy http://mail.jesp.org/index.php/jesp <p>The&nbsp;<em>Journal of Ethics and&nbsp;Social Philosophy</em>&nbsp;is a peer-reviewed online journal in moral, social, political, and legal philosophy. The journal welcomes submissions of articles in any of these and related fields of research. &nbsp;The journal is interested in work in the history of ethics that bears directly on topics of contemporary interest, but does not consider articles of purely historical interest.</p> <p>The <em>Journal of Ethics and&nbsp;Social Philosophy</em> aspires to be the leading venue for the best new work in the fields that it covers, and applies a correspondingly high editorial standard. &nbsp;But it is the view of the associate editors that this standard does not preclude publishing work that is critical in nature, provided that it is constructive, well-argued, current, and of sufficiently general interest.</p> <p>While the&nbsp;<em>Journal of Ethics and&nbsp;Social Philosophy</em>&nbsp;will consider longer articles, in general the journal would prefer articles that do not exceed 15,000 words, and articles of all lengths will be evaluated in terms of what they accomplish in proportion to their length. Articles under 3k words should be submitted as discussion notes, which are reviewed and published separately from main articles. &nbsp;</p> en-US jespmanagingeditor@gmail.com (Jesse Wilson) jespmanagingeditor@gmail.com (Jesse Wilson) Wed, 06 Nov 2019 16:42:00 +0000 OJS 3.1.2.1 http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss 60 What's New About Fake News? http://mail.jesp.org/index.php/jesp/article/view/629 <p>The term "fake news" ascended rapidly to prominence in 2016 and has become a fixture in academic and public discussions, as well as in political mud-slinging. In the flurry of discussion, the term has been applied so broadly as to threaten to render it meaningless. In an effort to rescue our ability to discuss—and combat—the underlying phenomenon that triggered the present use of the term, some philosophers have tried to characterize it more precisely. A common theme in this nascent philosophical discussion is that contemporary fake news is not a new kind of phenomenon, but just the latest iteration of a broader kind of phenomenon that has played out in different ways across the history of human information-dissemination technologies. While we agree with this, we argue that newer sorts of fake news reveal substantial flaws in earlier understandings of this notion. In particular, we argue that no deceptive intentions are necessary for fake news to arise; rather, fake news arises when stories which were not produced via standard journalistic practice are treated as though they had been. Importantly, this revisionary understanding of fake news allows us to accommodate and understand the way that fake news is plausibly generated and spread in a contemporary setting, as much by non-human actors as by ordinary human beings.</p> Eliot Michaelson, Rachel Sterken, Jessica Pepp Copyright (c) 2019 Eliot Michaelson, Rachel Sterken, Jessica Pepp http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 http://mail.jesp.org/index.php/jesp/article/view/629 Tue, 02 Jul 2019 18:59:06 +0000 Rights, Roles and Interests http://mail.jesp.org/index.php/jesp/article/view/398 <p>I argue that rights that protect our performance of roles are grounded in our interests in performing that role. Many of valuable roles are partly constituted by duties or obligations.&nbsp; Nonetheless these roles—even apparently burdensome roles—contribute to our interests. Once it is bestowed upon them, the role has special value to its bearer. Under certain conditions, the individual’s interest in performing their role is sufficient to ground rights. I conclude by briefly discussing the possibility of detached or non-committed rights attributions. Within law and other systems of positive norms, role-based rights may also be attributed in a non-committed way in situations where it is believed by others that the roles in question are grounded in the interests of their bearers.</p> Robert Mullins Copyright (c) 2019 Robert Mullins http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 http://mail.jesp.org/index.php/jesp/article/view/398 Tue, 02 Jul 2019 19:00:46 +0000 Making Peace with Moral Imperfection http://mail.jesp.org/index.php/jesp/article/view/767 <div class="abstract"> <div class="abstract_item">How can we rationally make peace with our past moral failings, while committing to avoid similar mistakes in the future? Is it because we cannot do anything about the past, while the future is still open? Or is it that regret for our past mistakes is psychologically harmful, and we need to forgive ourselves in order to be able to move on? Or is it because moral mistakes enable our moral growth? I argue that these and other answers do not properly resolve the problem of temporal asymmetry in our attitudes toward moral imperfection, and I defend an alternative response, centered on our personal attachments and our biographical identity.</div> </div> Camil Golub Copyright (c) 2019 Camil Golub http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 http://mail.jesp.org/index.php/jesp/article/view/767 Wed, 21 Aug 2019 17:35:39 +0000 Fittingness and Good Reasoning http://mail.jesp.org/index.php/jesp/article/view/782 <p>Conor McHugh and Jonathan Way have defended a view of good reasoning according to which good reasoning is explained in terms of the preservation of fittingness.&nbsp; I argue that their Fittingness View is incorrect.&nbsp; Not all fittingness-preserving transitions in thought are instances of good reasoning.&nbsp;</p> John Brunero Copyright (c) 2019 John Brunero http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 http://mail.jesp.org/index.php/jesp/article/view/782 Fri, 12 Jul 2019 00:00:00 +0000 "Fake News" and Conceptual Ethics http://mail.jesp.org/index.php/jesp/article/view/648 <p>In a recent contribution to conceptual ethics, Joshua Habgood-Coote argues that philosophers should refrain from using the term “fake news,” which is commonly employed in public discussions focusing on the epistemic health of democracies. In this short discussion note, I take issue with this claim, discussing each of the three arguments advanced by Coote to support the conclusion that we should abandon this concept. First, I contend that although “fake news” is a contested concept, there is significant agreement among contemporary philosophers about its key feature. Second, I argue against the claim that “fake news” is an unnecessary concept by underlying that it is not reducible to other terms we customarily use to describe the epistemic dysfunctions of democracies. Lastly, I suggest that using the term “fake news” need not serve propagandistic aims, and that philosophers can use this concept without engaging in epistemic policing, that is, commanding their interlocutors not to believe specific news stories or sources.</p> Etienne Brown Copyright (c) 2019 Etienne Brown http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 http://mail.jesp.org/index.php/jesp/article/view/648 Mon, 07 Oct 2019 00:00:00 +0000