ENCLAVES FOR THE EXCLUDED

A PESSIMISTIC DEFENSE

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IN WESTERN liberal democracies, and especially in Europe, the politics of immigration is intertwined with the politics of integration. Approaches to integration vary across national contexts, but there are also significant points of convergence.[1] One such point of convergence is the widely held view that immigrants have a *duty to integrate* in receiving societies. In the United Kingdom, for example, successive Labour and Conservative governments have made the integration of immigrants a political priority in response to popular anxiety about immigrant communities being disconnected from the social and cultural mainstream. In October 2023, Suella Braverman, then home secretary, chastised immigrants for living "parallel lives" and "not taking part in British life."[2]

At the same time as they are expected to integrate, members of some immigrant communities are viewed and treated as inferiors in receiving societies. Anti-immigrant attitudes are widespread in Europe in general, but they are especially pronounced for some immigrant communities in particular—typically, predominantly Muslim ethnic minority communities.[3] Anti-immigrant attitudes are expressed both in media discourse and in a political culture in which immigrant minorities are stigmatized and represented as a civilizational threat.[4] And crucially, it is often precisely those immigrant communities that are most stigmatized who are the primary addressees of the demand to integrate.

This paper investigates the claim that immigrants have a duty to integrate in light of the fact that many immigrants who are expected to integrate are stigmatized in receiving societies. I argue that immigrant minorities who face a particular kind of relational inequality—social exclusion—have a moral permission

1 Joppke, "Beyond National Models."

2 Hughes, "Braverman."

3 Semyonov, Raijman, and Gorodzeisky, "The Rise of Anti-Foreigner Sentiment in Europe"; and Bell, Valenta, and Strabac, "A Comparative Analysis of Changes in Anti-Immigrant and Anti-Muslim Attitudes in Europe."

4 Brubaker, "Between Nationalism and Civilizationism"; and Saeed, "Media, Racism and Islamophobia."

to form enclaves. Enclaves, as I understand them here, conflict with at least some putative duties to integrate. So my argument suggests that immigrants who face social exclusion have, at most, limited duties to integrate.

My defense of enclaves for the excluded involves a positive argument and a negative argument. Positively, I argue that enclaves can play an important role in supporting the self-respect of members of socially excluded groups. Social exclusion is a threat to self-respect, and enclaves can have a protective function for those whose self-respect is threatened in this way. Negatively, I argue social exclusion makes the duty to integrate unreasonably burdensome. I also argue that even if integration is a genuine duty, it cannot be permissibly enforced as a social expectation vis-à-vis socially excluded immigrants, because members of dominant social groups lack the standing to blame socially excluded immigrants for failing to integrate.

But while I argue that socially excluded immigrants have only limited duties to integrate, I also accept that integration can be an important way of combatting relational inequality. My argument thus has a pessimistic conclusion: social exclusion means that immigrant minorities have at best only limited duties to integrate, but it is in the context of social exclusion that integration is particularly valuable.

My focus in this paper is on the integration of *immigrants* in particular, and I focus on first-generation, voluntary immigrants. To the extent that they face both social exclusion and the demand for integration, however, my argument also applies to second- and third-generation immigrants. It may also extend to other, nonimmigration contexts in which minorities face both social exclusion and the demand for integration, such as racial segregation in the United States, although there are clearly significant differences between these contexts. But the primary context that motivates my inquiry is that which Sune Lægaard calls "euro-multiculturalism," in which it is immigrant communities—typically ethnic and religious minorities—who are the primary addressees of demands to integrate.[5] And as we will see, there is an objection to my argument that applies to first-generation, voluntary immigrants in particular: that those who have migrated voluntarily have waived their moral permission to form enclaves. Voluntary immigrants thus represent a hard case for my argument. If I can show that voluntary immigrants have a moral permission to form enclaves when they face social exclusion, then this bears well on the prospects for my argument more generally.

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5   Lægaard, "Unequal Recognition, Misrecognition and Injustice." See also Holtug, *The Politics of Social Cohesion*, 23–37.

The paper proceeds as follows. First, in section 1, I clarify three central concepts involved in my argument: integration, enclaves, and social exclusion. Then, I make the positive and negative arguments for my central claim: the positive argument from self-respect (section 2.1) and the negative argument from unreasonable burdens and standing (section 2.2). I then consider two objections to my argument: that those who have migrated voluntarily have waived their moral permission to engage in enclave formation (section 3.1) and that enclaves may hinder the pursuit of relational equality (section 3.2). Finally, in section 4, I conclude by highlighting a virtue of my argument and an upshot of my argument for debates about immigrant integration.

1. INTEGRATION, ENCLAVES, AND SOCIAL EXCLUSION

'Integration' can refer both to a *state* and to a *process*. A state of integration exists when there are no significant patterns of differentiation between members of different social groups. Conversely, a society is segregated to the extent that its members are differentiated according to their membership in different social groups. We can imagine a continuum with a fully integrated society at one end a fully segregated society at the other, with a society being more or less integrated according to its degree of differentiation by social group membership.

As a process, integration refers to a dynamic of *mutual adjustment* between majorities and minorities that brings a society into a more integrated state. This process of mutual adjustment may involve changing norms and expectations, patterns of behavior and social practices, and/or values and beliefs. This dynamic of mutual adjustment is what distinguishes integration from *assimilation*, where one group—typically a minority group—adjusts to the norms, values, customs, and behaviors of another.[6] Integration can also vary along different dimensions. David Miller distinguishes between *civic*, *cultural*, and *social* forms of integration.[7] My focus in this paper is primarily on social integration, although these three forms of integration are often intertwined in practice. Social integration refers to people regularly interacting with each other in a range of social contexts, for example by working alongside each other, living in the same neighborhoods, attending the same schools, joining the same associations, and mixing socially in friendships and marriages.[8]

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6   Parekh, *Rethinking Multiculturalism*, 219–24; Modood, *Multiculturalism*, 48; Mason, "The Critique of Multiculturalism in Britain"; and Klarenbeek, "Reconceptualising 'Integration as a Two-Way Process.'"

7   Miller, *Strangers in Our Midst*, 132–33.

8   Miller, *Strangers in Our Midst*, 132. See also Anderson, *The Imperative of Integration*, 116–17.

This account of integration is not moralized. Nothing in the concept of integration itself—either as a state or a process—means that it is morally valuable. But advocates of integration have argued that it is a morally valuable social goal, for example because it sustains support for just institutions, promotes social cohesion, or creates a shared national identity.[9] Miller argues that social integration is valuable for two reasons. First, it is valuable because it opens up greater opportunities for immigrants themselves. And second, it is valuable because it creates a basis of trust and helps to prevent intergroup conflict in society more broadly.[10]

If integration is a valuable social goal, then immigrants may have a moral duty to participate in the process of integration. What exactly would such a "duty to integrate" involve? If we focus on social integration, then this duty would involve immigrants orienting their patterns of social interaction towards the receiving society as a whole rather than only or predominantly towards other members of a community to which they belong. This could involve, for example, mixing socially with nonimmigrants in friendships, workplaces, and voluntary associations. If there is a duty to integrate in this sense, then it is an *imperfect* duty to engage in these behaviors to a sufficient degree rather than a perfect duty to interact with any particular individual, and what counts as sufficient will vary on different views of the duty to integrate. Given the two-way nature of the process of integration, the duty to integrate could also be a *conditional* duty, which would mean that immigrants have a duty to integrate only if nonimmigrants also do their part in the process of integration. As we will see, my argument does suggest that this is a fruitful way of understanding the duty of integration. But this is something to be established through argument rather than something to be built into the idea of the duty to integrate from the start. For the moment, we can treat the duty to integrate as a putative duty owed by immigrants to mix socially to a sufficient degree with nonimmigrants within the receiving society.

Depending on which justification we give for integration, the duty to integrate may be owed either to immigrants themselves or to the receiving society more broadly. For the moment, I will treat the duty to integrate as a duty owed to the receiving society. I do so because this is how the duty to integrate is often implicitly understood when it is invoked in public claims that immigrants ought to integrate. In the later part of the paper, however, I return to the idea

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9   See, respectively, Mason, *Living Together as Equals*; Holtug, *The Politics of Social Cohesion*; and Miller, *Strangers in Our Midst*.

10   Miller, *Strangers in Our Midst*, 133–34.

that the duty to integrate might be justified by reference to the interests of immigrants themselves.

Joseph Carens distinguishes three ways that we might think about the duty to integrate: as a *requirement*, as an *expectation*, and as an *aspiration*.[11] A requirement is a duty that is explicit and legally enforceable, such as a citizenship test or an integration class with penalties for nonparticipation. An expectation is an informal duty that is enforced through social sanctions, such as a social norm according to which those who do not integrate are liable to blame. An aspiration is a mere hope that immigrants will integrate, without any formal or informal sanctions attached. My focus is on the *expectation* that immigrants should integrate, as well as the corresponding social sanctions that are applied to immigrants who do not.[12] This focus allows us to examine behaviors that are not usually enforced through legal restrictions, such as mixing socially in friendships, voluntary associations, and workplaces.

The second concept that plays a central role in my argument is the concept of the *enclave*. An enclave is a pattern of social differentiation in which members of a minority social group cluster together, spatially and/or socially, in ways that they can reflectively endorse. Members of a social group who form enclaves typically see themselves as deriving some benefits—some of which I explore below—from clustering together.

This account of enclaves is somewhat broader than the way that the term is sometimes used in the social sciences. In urban geography, the concept of the enclave is used to refer specifically to a pattern of *spatial* differentiation. Peter Marcuse characterizes an enclave as "a spatially concentrated area in which members of a particular population group, self-defined by ethnicity or religion or otherwise, congregate as a means of enhancing their economic, social, political and/or cultural development."[13] Here, I use the term more broadly to refer to a pattern in which members of a social group cluster together in social and/or spatial terms. In this broader sense, members of a social group may form an enclave even if they are not spatially clustered, if their patterns of social interaction differentiate them from others in the broader society. But typically, social and spatial enclave formation will go hand in hand, since patterns of social interaction and patterns of residence are closely connected.

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11 Carens, "The Integration of Immigrants," 30–31.

12 My focus is on the *normative* expectation that immigrants should integrate, which is accompanied by blame when it is not fulfilled, rather than on the *descriptive* expectation that immigrants will integrate, the nonfulfillment of which might generate other reactions such as surprise or confusion. For this distinction, see Bicchieri, *The Grammar of Society*, 13–15.

13 Marcuse, "The Enclave, the Ghetto and the Citadel," 242.

Marcuse also distinguishes enclaves from another pattern of social differentiation: *ghettos*. A ghetto is "a spatially concentrated area used to separate and to limit a particular involuntarily defined population (usually by race) held to be, and treated as, inferior by the dominant society."[14] A ghetto differs from an enclave in that it is an involuntary form of segregation that is imposed on a social group. Enclaves, by contrast, are usually understood as involving at least some degree of *self-segregation*.[15] Understood in this way, enclaves and ghettos are ideal types. In reality, the lines between them are blurred. In many of the neighborhoods that social scientists characterize as enclaves, patterns of social differentiation are likely to result from a mixture of involuntary constraints, such as limited availability of affordable housing, and voluntary decisions, such as a desire to live in a neighborhood with others who speak the same language or have similar customs and lifestyles.[16] For this reason, I think it is better to say that enclaves are patterns of social differentiation that can be *reflectively endorsed* by their members rather than to say that they are the consequence of perfectly voluntary decisions. This conception allows for a pattern of social differentiation to be an enclave even if there is some degree of involuntariness in its causal genesis, if its members nonetheless affirm their participation within it, or would do so upon reflection. One test for whether a pattern of social differentiation is an enclave is whether those who participate in it do so even though there are real opportunities for them to do otherwise, for example by changing jobs, moving house, or participating in different cultural or social activities. These alternative opportunities need not be cost-free, but they should be effectively open to immigrant minorities.

Enclaves conflict with integration in the sense that the more enclaves there are in a society and the more pronounced those enclaves are, the less that society is in an integrated state. But enclaves need not involve *total* separation from other social groups. The existence of enclaves is compatible with some degree of integration in a society. Integration is a matter of degree, and the degree to which a society is integrated will depend in part on how pronounced and widespread enclaves are within it.

The third concept that plays a central role in my argument is *social exclusion*. Social exclusion, as I understand it here, is a particular kind of relational inequality. Social hierarchies are durable, systematic inequalities between members of different social groups that are sustained by norms, rules, and

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14   Marcuse, "The Enclave, the Ghetto and the Citadel," 231.

15   Soja, *Seeking Spatial Justice*, 54–56.

16   De Haas, *How Migration Really Works*, 182–95; and Portes and Manning, "The Immigrant Enclave."

habits.[17] Elizabeth Anderson distinguishes between hierarchies of *command*, *standing*, and *esteem*.[18] Hierarchies of command involve asymmetric relationships of command and obedience in which those in superior social positions hold unaccountable and arbitrary power over those in inferior social positions. Hierarchies of standing involve practices and institutions whereby the interests of those in superior social positions are given greater weight than the interests of those in inferior social positions. And hierarchies of esteem involve the stigmatization of those in inferior social positions and the valorization of those in superior social positions.

Social exclusion is a hierarchy of esteem in this sense (or a "disparity of regard," in Niko Kolodny's terms).[19] Those who are socially excluded are placed in inferior social positions in a pervasive hierarchy of esteem. They are "subject to publicly authoritative stereotypes that represent them as proper objects of dishonor, contempt, disgust, fear, or hatred on the basis of their group identities."[20] Social exclusion may involve explicit prejudice or hate speech, but most often it involves less explicit forms of prejudice that pervade informal and quotidian interactions between members of different social groups and are legitimated by socially influential ideologies.[21] Following Cécile Laborde's use of the term in her discussion of the treatment of Muslim minorities in France, I use 'social exclusion' to refer to these hierarchies of esteem.[22]

Many immigrants are socially excluded in this sense. Anti-immigrant prejudice is widespread in Europe, and it typically intersects with racial and ethnic prejudice.[23] Many of those immigrants who face the most public pressure to participate in integration—in Europe, they are typically members of Muslim minority groups—face this kind of social exclusion. There are competing explanations for these patterns of anti-immigrant prejudice in the sociological literature, with some studies emphasizing the role of perceived competitive threat, some the role of a perceived clash of values, and some the role of racial

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17 Anderson, "Equality," 42.

18 Anderson, "Equality," 42–44; and Kolodny, *The Pecking Order*, 91–95.

19 Kolodny, *The Pecking Order*, 103–16.

20 Anderson, "Equality," 43.

21 See McTernan, "Microaggressions, Equality, and Social Practices"; and Haslanger, *Resisting Reality*, 446–78.

22 Laborde, *Critical Republicanism*, 202–28.

23 Bell, Valenta, and Strabac, "A Comparative Analysis of Changes in Anti-Immigrant and Anti-Muslim Attitudes in Europe"; and Semyonov, Raijman, and Gorodzeisky, "The Rise of Antiforeigner Sentiment in Europe."

biases.[24] For our purposes, the ultimate source of anti-immigrant prejudice is less important than its effect in creating a pervasive hierarchy of esteem that puts members of some immigrant groups in inferior social positions.

2. ENCLAVES FOR THE EXCLUDED

My central claim in this paper is that members of immigrant groups that face social exclusion have a moral permission to form enclaves. Correspondingly, they have no moral duty to participate in forms in integration that would be inconsistent with their forming enclaves. But before defending this claim, it is worth pausing to reflect on whether and why enclaves for the excluded stand in need of defense.

First, it is worth pointing out that many immigrants *do* want to integrate, and many do so wholeheartedly. In fact, the main challenge in this area is typically that immigrants who want to integrate face significant barriers, such as discrimination in labor and housing markets.[25] But the fact that many immigrants do in fact integrate does not make the question of whether they have a duty to do so irrelevant. For one thing, a defense of enclaves recasts the moral significance of the integration of socially excluded immigrants. If successful, it shows that many socially excluded immigrants do in fact integrate, despite the significant barriers that they face, *even though they have no duty to do so*. For another, some immigrants choose *not* to participate in integration, and others might do so only because of the social expectation that they ought to do so. In order to evaluate these choices, we need to know whether this expectation can be morally justified.

Second, we might think that members of socially excluded immigrant groups—like everyone else—are simply entitled to decide for themselves with whom they want to associate. Freedom of association, at least as it is conventionally understood, entitles members of immigrant groups to make decisions for themselves about with whom they want to associate, without interference by the state.[26] If we are committed to freedom of association, we might think that enclaves do not stand in need of justification in the first place.

Even if we are committed to freedom of association, we still have two good reasons to investigate whether socially excluded immigrants have a moral

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24 See, respectively, Quillian, "Prejudice as a Response to Perceived Group Threat"; Schneider, "Anti-Immigrant Attitudes in Europe"; and Gorodzeisky and Semyonov, "Not Only Competitive Threat but Also Racial Prejudice."

25 De Haas, Castles, and Miller, *The Age of Migration*, 297–316.

26 For a critical evaluation of this conventional understanding of freedom of association, see Brownlee, "Freedom of Association."

permission to form enclaves. First, we can evaluate the associative choices that people make even if we do not believe that the state should intervene in those choices. It is important to understand whether and why immigrants have a moral duty to integrate that can be enforced as a *social expectation* in the receiving society, even if this has no implications in terms of the state's actions. Second, states' policy choices inevitably shape the social environment—and thereby patterns of intergroup interaction—even without directly interfering with anyone's associative choices. Housing and planning policy, subsidies and exemptions for different kinds of associations and activities—these make some associative choices easier or more attractive than others, even if that is not their primary goal. Although my argument does not by itself imply that the state has any positive duty to *facilitate* enclave formation, it does articulate reasons that suggest that the state ought not to use these tools to *undermine* enclaves.

2.1. The Positive Argument: Self-Respect

The positive argument for the permissibility of enclave formation says that a moral permission to form enclaves is justified because enclaves can play an important role for immigrants in protecting their self-respect in the face of social exclusion.[27] The basic idea here is that social exclusion is a threat to self-respect, and enclaves can be an important way for socially excluded immigrants to maintain their self-respect. So what exactly is self-respect, how does social exclusion threaten it, and how can enclaves protect it?

Self-respect is, in general terms, a "sure confidence in the sense of one's own worth."[28] Philosophers tend to divide self-respect into two subtypes. The first type, *appraisal self-respect*, or *standards self-respect*, is a merit-based form of self-respect.[29] Appraisal or standards self-respect is about living up to certain (moral, practical, aesthetic) standards associated with one's self-conception in terms of life plans and projects. A musician might have appraisal or standards self-respect when they live up to the standards associated with their self-conception as a

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27 Michael Merry has drawn on the concept of self-respect to defend what he calls "voluntary separation" for some minority groups. See Merry, *Equality, Citizenship, and Segregation* and "Equality, Self-Respect and Voluntary Separation." My argument differs from Merry's in two ways. First, Merry is focused on schooling, which raises some distinct concerns, whereas my argument is directed at social interaction more broadly. Second, Merry's argument from self-respect primarily aims to show that integration on unequal terms undermines self-respect. My argument develops an explanation of why social exclusion amounts to a threat to self-respect and how enclaves can protect against that threat, which draws on recent developments in the literature on self-respect.

28 Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, 38.

29 Darwall, "Two Kinds of Respect," 39; and Schemmel, "Real Self-Respect and Its Social Bases," 631–32.

musician by practicing the violin every day. The second type, which I am primarily interested in here, is often called *recognition self-respect* or *standing self-respect*.[30] This is a non-merit-based form of self-respect that is about one's own assessment of one's status in relationships with other people. Recognition or standing self-respect—or just *self-respect*, as I will refer to it—involves the conviction that one is a moral equal of others and that one is entitled to be treated in a way that is commensurate with one's moral equality. Thus understood, self-respect plays an important role in our lives as practical agents. On the Rawlsian view, self-respect gives us justified confidence in our two "moral powers"—the sense of justice and the capacity to develop and carry out a conception of the good—and plays a role in stabilizing just institutions.[31] But more broadly, self-respect's importance lies in its role in orienting our practical commitments as agents by enabling us to see ourselves as moral equals to others.

Self-respect is not the sort of thing that we can distribute directly. But we can arrange our social and political institutions in ways that are conducive to people developing a sense of self-respect. In doing so, we can distribute the "social bases of self-respect": the features of our societies that make us secure in our conviction of our own moral worth.[32] When our social institutions put us in a position where we can be secure in our sense of our own worth as moral equals, then they have secured for us the social bases of self-respect.

As this suggests, self-respect is partly a matter of an agent's own evaluation of their moral status and partly a matter of the social conditions that enable agents to make judgments about their moral equality. One central part of the social conditions relevant to self-respect is the treatment that we receive from others. Rawls suggests that self-respect "normally depends upon the respect of others."[33] Because self-respect is partly about one's status vis-à-vis others in a society, the respect (or disrespect) that we receive from others has an important bearing on how we view ourselves as moral agents. Our relationships with others are important points in anchoring our practical self-understanding as moral agents. This idea has found expression in theories of recognition, such as Axel Honneth's analysis of self-respect as being developed through an intersubjective process of mutual recognition and vulnerable to damage through misrecognition.[34]

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30 Darwall, "Two Kinds of Respect," 38; and Schemmel, "Real Self-Respect and Its Social Bases," 631–32.

31 See Krishnamurthy, "Completing Rawls's Arguments for Equal Political Liberty and Its Fair Value."

32 Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, 54.

33 Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, 155.

34 Honneth, *The Struggle for Recognition*. See also Margalit, *The Decent Society*.

This aspect of self-respect explains why social exclusion—being at the bottom end of a pervasive hierarchy of esteem—amounts to a threat to self-respect. Social exclusion is a signal that others do not consider you or members of your social group to have standing as their moral equal. When others treat you as their social inferior, they communicate that your "respect-standing" is lower than theirs, perhaps by behaving as if you are an object of pity or disgust or as if they have the right to expect deference and servility from you.[35] This can have an important bearing on one's self-respect. Those who are conscious of the way that others view them (and members of their social group more broadly) may internalize these views and thereby come to view themselves in terms of the prejudicial and stereotyping attitudes and norms that shape their social environment. As Emily McTernan puts it, those who face disrespect from others "lack the sort of respect from others required to underpin status self-respect, in lacking the status or standing within society that is required for it."[36] In this way, they are at risk of losing their sense of self-respect, or at least having it damaged or shaken.

Socially excluded immigrant minorities are confronted with this kind of threat to their self-respect. When they are represented by stereotypes as inferior to others, treated as such in everyday interactions with others, and denigrated by hate speech, they may come to lose their secure conviction of their own worth as moral equals of others.[37] Stereotypes that represent immigrant minorities as the proper object of fear, disgust, and contempt may be dominant among the cultural scripts and social resources that are available for agents to draw on in developing their self-conception. Socially excluded immigrant minorities may come to view themselves through the eyes of others who denigrate and mistreat them in their social interactions, and consequently they may lose a secure belief in their own moral worth. Of course, it is by no means the case that all socially excluded immigrant minorities comprehensively lose their self-respect in the face of social exclusion. But social exclusion is at least a *threat* to the self-respect of immigrant minorities.

One important challenge to this account of the relationship between social exclusion and self-respect comes from Colin Bird, who argues that a lack of respect from others does not constitute a *good reason* to lose confidence in one's own moral worth.[38] Responding to this challenge is important, not only because the challenge constitutes an objection to the argument from

35 Wolff, "Fairness, Respect, and the Egalitarian Ethos," 107.

36 McTernan, "The Inegalitarian Ethos," 95.

37 Seglow, "Hate Speech, Dignity and Self-Respect."

38 Bird, "Self-Respect and the Respect of Others."

self-respect but also because responding to it helps to illuminate why enclaves
in particular can protect against the threat to self-respect posed by social exclu-
sion. On Bird's view, losing one's self-respect in response to disrespectful treat-
ment by others is simply not an appropriate reaction: how others treat you
should have no bearing on how you view yourself. If a person loses their con-
viction of their own moral worth in response to mistreatment by others, then
they never had any self-respect in the first place. Those with self-respect are able
to withstand disrespectful treatment by others because of their disposition to
view their own moral worth as inviolable, not as something that depends on
the judgments of others.

This objection raises an important point: self-respect must be to at least
some degree *robust*.[39] If self-respect is to play the role that it is supposed to play
in orienting our lives, then it needs to be something that we can maintain in the
face of at least some adversity. If self-respect were so fragile that it crumbled
at the first sign of challenge, then it is not clear that it could play this role.[40] As
Christian Schemmel puts it, "trying to protect people against all conceivable
threats to their self-respect would mean, in effect, to try to relieve them of the
need to have any."[41] But as Schemmel argues, this does not mean that we need
to adopt the stoic view that self-respect has no social bases. The constitution
of our practical identities is clearly at least partly social, and so the stoic view
has an implausible view of the development of self-respect.[42] Given the social
nature of self-evaluation, people are understandably and inevitably influenced
by the treatment they receive from others in their evaluation of their own
worth. Their self-evaluation can be affected by the social and cultural scripts
that predominate in their social environments, which provide lenses through
which they can interpret their own moral status. But with the right resources,
people can retain a sense of self-respect even in the face of threats to it. Schem-
mel argues that the social bases of self-respect consist of the "motivational and
epistemic resources to arrive at, and retain, correct convictions of [one's] own
worth, even under injustice."[43]

My suggestion is that enclaves can serve the function of enabling agents to
maintain their self-respect under conditions of social exclusion. Enclaves have
features that make them well suited to enabling agents to respond to the threat
to their self-respect posed by social exclusion. In the empirical literature on

39   Schemmel, "Real Self-Respect and Its Social Bases."
40   Schemmel, "Real Self-Respect and Its Social Bases," 637.
41   Schemmel, "Real Self-Respect and Its Social Bases," 633.
42   Bratu, "Self-Respect and the Disrespect of Others."
43   Schemmel, "Real Self-Respect and Its Social Bases," 633.

immigrant enclaves, it has been suggested that enclaves can serve as "sources of mutual support" for those who face discrimination within society.[44] We can reconstruct this idea in terms of two main ways in which enclaves can have this protective function.

First, enclaves can enable those who face social exclusion to maintain their self-respect by shaping their social environment in a way that makes stigmatizing attitudes, judgments, and stereotypes less salient in comparison to alternative cultural scripts and social resources. By orienting their social lives towards other members of their social group, socially excluded immigrants can limit their exposure to stereotypes and stigmatizing attitudes of dominant majorities and increase their exposure to the attitudes of other members of their social group. To the extent that other members of one's social group are likely to affirm more positive attitudes, to disrupt stereotypes, or to recast negatively valanced claims in more positive terms, enclave formation can thus enable socially excluded immigrants to reshape their social environment in ways that are conducive to the development of self-respect. When socially excluded immigrants are more exposed to positive representations of their own social group, they may be less influenced by pervasive stereotypes and more inclined to see them as mistakes. They may draw on alternative sets of cultural scripts in developing their self-conceptions and so may be less likely to internalize attitudes and views that cast them as inferior to others. One way that this can manifest is in enjoying a sense of belonging to a social or cultural community that combats a sense of exclusion from the dominant majority. In this way, enclaves can enable members of socially excluded immigrant groups to limit the influence that social exclusion has on the development of their self-respect.

Second, enclaves can help socially excluded minorities to develop the epistemic and motivational capacities to resist their own social exclusion. The idea that resistance to injustice can help the oppressed to maintain their self-respect is widespread in the literature on self-respect.[45] Resisting one's oppression is a way of affirming one's moral worth in the face of assaults to it. My suggestion is that enclaves can function as an epistemic and motivational resource that can enable resistance to social exclusion.

As an epistemic resource, enclaves enable those who face social exclusion to come together, share experiences, and develop common interpretive frameworks for understanding their own situations.[46] The importance of these kinds

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44   Portes and Manning, "The Immigrant Enclave," 48.

45   See, for example, Boxill, "Self-Respect and Protest"; and Hay, "The Obligation to Resist Oppression."

46   Young, *Inclusion and Democracy*, 81–120. See also Draper, "Gentrification and Everyday Democracy."

of discursive spaces for the development of a critical consciousness among the oppressed has been stressed by both democratic theorists and standpoint epistemologists, who typically stress that an epistemically privileged standpoint of the oppressed is something that is achieved rather than given.[47] Coming together in enclaves can enable members of socially excluded immigrant groups to develop the epistemic and hermeneutical resources that they need to understand and contest their social exclusion.

As a motivational resource, enclaves enable members of a social group to develop the ties of intragroup solidarity that play an important motivational role in resisting social exclusion. Solidaristic relationships involve mutual identification as members of a group and a disposition to act together in pursuit of a shared goal, such as overcoming injustice.[48] Mutual identification and the disposition to act together make solidaristic relationships motivationally efficacious: they enable group members to solve coordination problems and to trust each other to do their part in collective action. Enclaves can help to build the dispositions and attitudes involved in solidaristic relationships. Those who socialize together in enclaves are more likely to mutually identify with each other and to view each other as trustworthy cooperators in shared projects, including the project of resisting their own social exclusion. Indeed, these features of enclaves have been identified by scholars of social movements as important in translating general sociological attributes like race, class, and immigration status into meaningful political identities that enable collective action.[49]

Enclaves can thus enable socially excluded immigrants to develop the epistemic and motivational resources that they need to resist their own social exclusion and, in so doing, to maintain their self-respect. The idea is not that by forming enclaves, immigrant minorities are able to eliminate injustice and oppression by engaging in resistance. It is rather that engaging in resistance—regardless of its ultimate success—is a way of affirming one's moral worth in the face of assaults against it. Since enclaves can enable resistance to injustice, they can enable the socially excluded to affirm their moral worth and so to protect their self-respect in conditions of adversity.

Of course, there are limits to these protective functions of enclaves. For one thing, there is no guarantee that the social attitudes expressed by other members of one's own social group always affirm rather than denigrate. In some contexts,

47 For democratic theory, see, for example, Mansbridge, "Everyday Talk in the Deliberative System"; Bohman, *Public Deliberation*, 132–42; and Fraser, "Rethinking the Public Sphere." For standpoint epistemology, see Toole, "Recent Work in Standpoint Epistemology"; Medina, *The Epistemology of Resistance*; and Fricker, *Epistemic Injustice*.

48 Sangiovanni and Viehoff, "Solidarity in Social and Political Philosophy."

49 Nicholls, "Place, Networks, Space"; and Castells, *The City and the Grassroots*.

stigmatizing attitudes may have become widely internalized. For another thing, the social attitudes expressed by other members of one's social group may themselves be confining. When the social identity categories that are salient in enclaves are tightly scripted, they may present an overly restrictive conception of what it means to be a member of the social group.[50] Tightly scripted social identity categories may even involve harmful social norms that can themselves undermine the self-respect of those who do not conform to intragroup norms about what kinds of behaviors or beliefs are expected of group members.

These potential costs to enclave formation are important, but they are not a reason to reject the idea that socially excluded immigrants have a moral permission to form enclaves. The costs and benefits of enclave formation will vary from person to person across different contexts, depending on—among other things—how vulnerable a person's self-respect is to the threat posed by social exclusion, how loosely or tightly scripted the identity categories in a particular enclave are, how much a person identifies with the social identity that is fostered within an enclave, and so on. Enclaves are one tool for protecting self-respect, and they are, for some, a valuable way of protecting against the threats posed by social exclusion. But for others, the costs of participating in enclaves may be too high relative to their benefits in terms of self-respect. This is why my claim is that socially excluded immigrants have a *permission* to form enclaves rather than a duty to do so. Those for whom the costs of enclave participation are too high are entitled to real opportunities to participate in other, more integrated forms of association. And where enclaves involve harmful intragroup social norms, we can object to the content of those norms without objecting to the idea that members of socially excluded groups have a moral permission to form enclaves.

These two features of enclaves explain why socially excluded immigrants have a moral permission to form enclaves. Forming enclaves can be an effective way to mitigate the threats to their self-respect posed by social exclusion, either by reducing the influence that social exclusion has in the development of one's self-conception or by enabling socially excluded immigrants to develop the epistemic and motivational resources to resist their social exclusion and thereby to reaffirm their moral worth.

2.2. *The Negative Argument: Unreasonable Burdens and Standing to Blame*

The negative argument for the permissibility of enclave formation rejects the claim that socially excluded immigrants have a moral duty to integrate, at least in ways that would be inconsistent with their forming enclaves. I argue both

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50 Darby and Martinez, "Making Identities Safe for Democracy."

that the duty to participate in social integration is unreasonably burdensome when imposed upon socially excluded immigrant minorities and that even if socially excluded immigrants do have a duty to integrate, this duty cannot be enforced as a social expectation because dominant majority groups lack the standing to blame socially excluded immigrants for failures to integrate.

The first part of this argument is that the duty to integrate is unreasonably burdensome when it is imposed upon those who face social exclusion. Immigrants who face social exclusion are put in inferior social positions in the pervasive hierarchy of esteem, and so they can reasonably expect to be treated as inferior by members of dominant or majority social groups. In modifying their patterns of social interaction to orient their social lives more towards members of the majority social group, socially excluded immigrant minorities can expect to confront stigma and hostility. They may, for example, feel pressure to modify their behavior or appearance in order to avoid aversive reactions on the part of members of the majority social group. There are costs that are imposed on socially excluded immigrant minorities when they are required to integrate socially, and my claim is that it is unreasonable to require socially excluded immigrants to bear such costs.[51]

The point here is not that it is unjustifiable to impose *any* costs on immigrant minorities in order to achieve the social goal of integration. If integration is a valuable social goal, then everyone—including immigrant minorities—may have a duty to bear some costs in order to achieve it. The integration of those from different backgrounds with different expectations and cultural practices is a morally fraught process, even in the absence of any injustices. It requires mutual accommodation and the development of "multicultural manners," whereby different parties learn to give way at some points.[52] All of this might involve immigrant minorities bearing some costs in the process of integration.

But even if it is reasonable to expect immigrants to bear some burdens in the process of integration, the duty to integrate may still be unreasonably burdensome when it is imposed upon those who face social exclusion. There are two possible interpretations of the claim that it is unreasonable to require socially excluded immigrants to bear the burdens associated with integration. The first is simply that the burdens associated with integration may be too high in the context of social exclusion. Being exposed to stigma and hostility in everyday social interactions—or even having to live with the expectation that one

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51 This claim is parallel to an argument made by Tommie Shelby that Black Americans living in segregated neighborhoods have no duty to participate in integration because requiring them to participate would impose unreasonable burdens upon them (*Dark Ghettos*, 73–76).

52 Levy, "Multicultural Manners."

might be exposed to stigma and hostility in every interaction—is a real cost that might be unjustifiable to impose on immigrant minorities in the name of integration. This is a claim about the total burdens that can be justifiably imposed upon immigrant minorities. On this interpretation, the central claim of the negative argument is that the burdens that socially excluded immigrants face in the process of integration are simply too high for the duty to integrate to be justified. This claim will be plausible in many contexts, especially where stigma and hostility are widespread. But its overall plausibility may depend on particular features of the context in which integration takes place, which may affect precisely how costly integration is for socially excluded immigrants.

The second interpretation of this claim is that it is unreasonable to expect socially excluded immigrants to bear the burdens of integration, given that dominant majority groups are creating those costs by failing to do their part in the process of integration. As we have seen, in contrast to assimilation, integration is typically understood as a two-way process, where both minorities and majorities mutually adjust their behaviors, values, or practices. On this picture, integration may well involve some costs for both majorities and minorities, but these costs are shared and represent a fair compromise that requires that each do their part in the process of integration. But in the context of social exclusion, dominant majority groups do not hold up their end of the bargain: sustaining a pervasive hierarchy of esteem that puts immigrant minorities in inferior social positions is inconsistent with a genuinely two-way process of integration. The demand that socially excluded immigrant minorities integrate thus becomes a demand that they assimilate, just one that is couched in the language of integration. Few explicitly defend assimilation, because if we want to achieve an integrated society, then it is fair to require that both minorities and majorities mutually adjust to achieve that social goal and unfair to require adjustment only of minorities. This interpretation treats social exclusion itself as incompatible with the process of integration and suggests that we should view the duty to integrate as a *conditional* duty that depends on dominant majority groups being credibly committed to doing their part in the process of integration.

This latter interpretation of the claim that the duty to integrate is unreasonably burdensome also supports a further step in the negative argument: even if it is a genuine duty, integration cannot be enforced as a social expectation because majorities lack the standing to blame socially excluded immigrants for failing to integrate. This further claim does not establish that socially excluded immigrants have no moral duty to integrate. Rather, it establishes that *even if* socially excluded immigrants have a moral duty to integrate, that duty cannot be enforced as a social expectation.

The basic idea here is that the claim that immigrant minorities ought to integrate is *second-personal* in nature. In Stephen Darwall's terms, second-personal claims come "with an RSVP attached": they make a demand of the addressee to act in a particular way or to account for their behavior to the speaker if they fail to do so.[53] The addressee of a justified second-personal claim is liable to be blamed if they fail to comply. Blaming is a paradigmatically *communicative* act that aims to make the addressee see the force of the shared moral reasons that the speaker presupposes in making a claim against them.[54] A social expectation is a generalized form of a second-personal claim in which those who uphold a social expectation treat those who fail to fulfill it as being liable to blame.

If integration is to be enforced as a social expectation, then not only must immigrant minorities be blameworthy for failing to integrate, but those who uphold the social expectation must also have standing to blame them for their failures. I have already suggested that socially excluded immigrant minorities do not have a duty to integrate and so are not liable to blame for failing to do so. But beyond this, my suggestion is that *even if* socially excluded immigrants do have a duty to integrate, such a duty cannot be enforced as a social expectation because members of dominant majority groups do not have standing to blame socially excluded immigrants who do not integrate. Regardless of whether or not socially excluded immigrants are blameworthy for not integrating, members of dominant majority groups who uphold the social expectation of integration are not, in Marilyn Friedman's terms, "blamer-worthy."[55]

In the literature on blame, two conditions for standing to blame have been identified: the *nonhypocrisy condition* and the *noninvolvement condition*.[56] The first suggests that those who have committed the same or a similar wrong to the target lack standing to blame. The second suggests that those who are in some way involved in the target's wrongdoing lack standing to blame. There is some disagreement about these conditions. For example, one disagreement concerns whether the nonhypocrisy condition is better explained by a lack of commitment to the relevant moral norm or by the idea that hypocrites reject the equality of persons by making an exception of themselves.[57] But these disagreements need not trouble us, because the social expectation that socially excluded immigrant minorities participate in social integration can be rejected on either

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53   Darwall, *The Second Person Standpoint*, 40–41.

54   Fricker, "What's the Point of Blame?"

55   Friedman, "How to Blame People Responsibly," 272.

56   Todd, "A Unified Account of the Moral Standing to Blame."

57   For the former view, see Rossi, "The Commitment Account of Hypocrisy." For the latter view, see Fritz and Miller, "Hypocrisy and the Standing to Blame."

the grounds of the nonhypocrisy condition or the noninvolvement condition, whether we adopt the commitment account or the equality account of hypocrisy.

The nonhypocrisy condition says that those who have committed the same or a similar wrong to the target lack standing to blame. In contexts of social exclusion, dominant majority groups collectively fall foul of this condition, which means that social integration cannot be enforced as a social expectation. In a society in which immigrant minorities face social exclusion, dominant majority groups collectively uphold norms that put immigrant minorities at the bottom end of a pervasive hierarchy of esteem. This is inconsistent with the genuine participation of the dominant group in the process of integration. Integration involves reciprocal duties on the part of both immigrant minority and dominant majority groups. When dominant majority groups collectively uphold norms of social exclusion, they do not do their part in the process of integration. It is hypocritical of them to hold socially excluded immigrant minorities to the duty of integration when they themselves fail to fulfill the same duty. On the commitment account of hypocrisy, their social exclusion of immigrant minorities betrays their lack of commitment to the moral norm of integration. On the equality account of hypocrisy, those who hold immigrant minorities but not themselves to the moral norm of integration make an exception of themselves and so violate the moral equality of persons. Whichever account of hypocrisy we adopt, we can say that dominant majority groups collectively lack the standing to blame socially excluded immigrant minorities for failing to integrate. Since the social expectation of integration requires that dominant majority groups have standing to blame for failures to integrate, this means that the social expectation of integration cannot be enforced vis-à-vis socially excluded immigrants.

The noninvolvement condition says that those who are involved in the target's wrongdoing lack standing to blame. The notion of involvement is somewhat vague, but in the case at hand it can be rendered in the following way: dominant majorities are involved in the failure of socially excluded immigrant minorities to integrate because they have created the conditions in which discharging the duty to integrate is highly burdensome. Social integration is burdensome for socially excluded immigrants, who can expect to be exposed to stigma and hostility in their interactions with members of dominant majority groups. Collectively, dominant majorities are responsible for making it burdensome for socially excluded immigrants to discharge their duty of social integration. When socially excluded immigrants fail to discharge that duty as a result of those burdens, dominant majorities are involved in the failure to discharge the duty of social integration. And when dominant majority groups are involved in the failure of immigrant minorities to integrate by upholding

norms of social exclusion, those dominant majorities lack standing to blame immigrant minorities for failing to integrate.

The unreasonable burdens argument suggests that socially excluded immigrant minorities have a moral permission to form enclaves because they do not have a duty to integrate, such that they are not blameworthy for failures of integration. The standing to blame argument suggests that even if socially excluded immigrants do have such a duty, it cannot be permissibly enforced as a social expectation.

This standing argument leaves open the possibility that those who are not implicated in the social exclusion of immigrant minorities—other members of the socially excluded group, for example—might have standing to blame those who fail to integrate. It also leaves open the possibility that majorities might either acquire standing to blame by changing social conditions such that immigrants no longer face social exclusion or have standing to blame immigrants who are not socially excluded. As I have already suggested, I do not think that socially excluded immigrants do have a genuine duty to integrate. But if they ultimately do have such a duty, then it seems plausible to suggest that it would be other socially excluded immigrants (rather than dominant majorities who are implicated in social exclusion) who have standing to enforce that duty through social sanctions such as blame. If anyone has standing to blame, then it is others who are similarly situated vis-à-vis the problem of social exclusion. I take this to be a welcome implication of the argument from standing to blame.

3. OBJECTIONS

In this section, I consider two objections to my argument. The first objection says that because many immigrants—unlike members of other social groups—have chosen to enter a country voluntarily, they have waived their moral permission to form enclaves. The second objection says that because social integration has an important causal role in reducing prejudice, enclave formation may hinder the pursuit of relational equality.

3.1. Voluntary Immigration and Enclaves

The first objection says that because immigrants have chosen to enter a country voluntarily, they have thereby waived their moral permission to form enclaves. The basic idea is that since those who have immigrated voluntarily have made a free choice to do so, they cannot reasonably expect to escape a duty to integrate within their host society. In his discussion of immigrant integration, Will Kymlicka makes a similar argument about cultural minority rights. On his view, immigrants "voluntarily relinquish" or "waive" their claims to "live and work in

their own culture."[58] If this is right, then voluntary immigrants may waive their moral permission to form enclaves. As Kymlicka recognizes, one limit to this argument is that it only applies to those who have actually made a voluntary choice to migrate. This means that it does not apply to either the children of first-generation immigrants or refugees.[59] This limits the scope of the objection. But as sociologists who study migration point out, enclaves are typically most pronounced among first-generation immigrants in any case.[60] So the objection may nonetheless still apply to a considerable range of cases.

Although Kymlicka does view integration as a two-way process and suggest that states should work to reduce prejudice and discrimination against immigrants, he does not suggest that social exclusion affects the duty to integrate.[61] The hypothetical example that he uses to motivate his argument that immigrants waive their claim to cultural minority rights—the emigration of a group of Americans to Sweden—involves no pervasive hierarchy of esteem with the immigrant group at the bottom. But in reality, many immigrants—even voluntary ones—face social exclusion in their new societies. Might this mean that they retain their moral permission to form enclaves? Kymlicka's argument may apply to those who do not face social exclusion—I take no stand on that question here—but when it comes to the socially excluded, the picture is quite different.

We can view the decision to immigrate as the decision to accept a kind of implicit contract. On this picture, immigrants accept the terms that the state offers to them when they decide to settle within a society. The duty to integrate is one contractual term to which immigrants sign up when they decide to migrate. Those who are forced to migrate cannot be said to have accepted the terms that the state offers—they have accepted the migration contract only under duress—but this does not apply to voluntary immigrants.

One reason we might think that even voluntary immigrants do not waive their moral permission to form enclaves by migrating is because they have an right to migrate. If would-be immigrants have a right to migrate, then they cannot be reasonably required to forgo their moral permission to form enclaves in order to exercise that right. In a related discussion of whether immigrants can consent to permanent alienage (i.e., denizenship without access to citizenship), Kieran Oberman argues that permanent alienage is wrongful not because would-be immigrants cannot consent to it but because they have a right to

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58 Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship*, 96.

59 Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship*, 98–100, 215–16n19.

60 Portes and Manning, "The Immigrant Enclave."

61 Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship*, 96.

migrate.[62] This means that their exercise of their right to migrate cannot be taken as evidence that they have accepted the terms of the migration contract that states have imposed upon them. As he puts it, "if a voluntary migrant has a right to immigrate, then one cannot infer a migrant's consent to the terms of her admission from the fact that she has chosen to migrate."[63] Similarly, we might think that voluntary immigrants do not waive their moral permission to form enclaves by migrating because they have a right to migrate independently of whether or not they waive that permission.

The main problem with this argument is that it requires us to accept a controversial premise: that would-be immigrants have a right to migrate. To say that this premise is controversial is not to say that it is mistaken, and I remain agnostic here on whether or not there is a right to migrate. But my defense of enclaves will have much broader reach if it does not require us to accept this controversial premise and is instead consistent with what Carens calls the "conventional view" of the political morality of immigration, according to which each state has a discretionary right to exclude would-be immigrants.[64]

We can reject the claim that socially excluded immigrants waive their moral permission to form enclaves when they migrate voluntarily even within the constraints of the conventional view. This is because the receiving state having a discretionary right to exclude would-be immigrants is consistent with there being moral constraints on the exercise of that right. Just as an employer who has no duty to hire anyone faces constraints on the kinds of criteria they can use to make hiring decisions and the kinds of terms they can put in their employment contracts, so too are there moral constraints on the state's exercise of its discretionary right to exclude would-be immigrants.[65] One such constraint is that states may not impose unfair terms within the migration contract. When they do so, such terms are morally unenforceable.

The requirement that socially excluded immigrants waive their moral permission to form enclaves as a condition of entry should be viewed as an unfair and thus morally unenforceable term in the migration contract. Michael Blake has recently argued that states may implement only those immigration policies that would-be immigrants can accept "without accepting their own moral inferiority."[66] On Blake's view, this rules out immigration policies that select according to race or religion. But it also rules out a migration contract—even

62   Oberman, "Immigration, Citizenship, and Consent."

63   Oberman, "Immigration, Citizenship, and Consent," 105.

64   Carens, *The Ethics of Immigration*, 10.

65   Carens, *The Ethics of Immigration*, 174–75.

66   Blake, *Justice, Migration, and Mercy*, 121.

an implicit one—that requires immigrants to accept their own social exclusion as a condition of entry. Such a contract is unfair because requiring those who face social exclusion to waive their moral permission to form enclaves is akin to requiring them to acquiesce to their own subordination. It says to would-be immigrants that they can enter only on the condition that they accept that their place is at the bottom of the social hierarchy of esteem and give up the right to use defense mechanisms to protect their self-respect. Some would-be immigrants might well prefer to accept the offer to migrate under such conditions rather than to forgo the option of migrating at all. But this is not a choice that it is fair to ask them to make. Even if would-be immigrants were to voluntarily accept such a contract, its unfairness means that it morally unenforceable. If my landlord puts in my rental contract that I am not allowed to jump on my own bed and refuses to negotiate on this term, then the appropriate response is to smile, sign the paperwork, and jump on the bed anyway. My landlord has no right to make such a demand of me, and no reasonable tenancy law would permit him to enforce his claim that I not jump on my own bed.[67] Neither do receiving societies have the right to require that immigrant minorities accept their position as moral inferiors. This explains why socially excluded immigrant minorities retain their moral permission to form enclaves, even if they have migrated voluntarily and even if states have a discretionary right to exclude.

3.2. Integration and Prejudice-Reduction

A second objection to my argument is that enclaves for the excluded may close off promising avenues for achieving relational equality. The basic idea here is that, at least according to some important findings in social psychology, integration can play an important role in reducing prejudice. Integration thus has the potential to ameliorate the condition of social exclusion faced by groups such as immigrant minorities. But if enclaves for the excluded are permitted, then this avenue for achieving relational equality is foreclosed, or at least hindered.

In social psychology, the "contact hypothesis" suggests that patterns of interaction across group lines can reduce prejudice.[68] The basic idea is that positive interactions between members of different social groups can break down prejudice by broadening the boundaries of the perceived in-group, reducing reliance on stereotypes and defusing anxiety and antipathy about interacting with those from other social groups. An influential meta-analysis has found that the vast majority of empirical tests support the claim that positive intergroup

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67 This analogy is inspired by a similar one used in Jubb, "Consent and Deception," 227.

68 The *locus classicus* is Allport, *The Nature of Prejudice*.

contact typically reduces prejudice.[69] In relation to immigration in particu-
lar, research has shown that positive contact can reduce anti-immigrant prej-
udice, particularly by reducing the perceived threat felt by nonimmigrants.[70]
Positive contact has also been shown to reduce the influence of inegalitarian
social norms and to reduce support for anti-immigrant and far-right parties.[71]
In the context of US racial politics, Elizabeth Anderson draws on the contact
hypothesis in her defense of integration, arguing that it plays a critical role in
prejudice reduction.[72] Likewise, we might argue that the beneficial effects of
integration for prejudice reduction mean that we should reject the claim that
socially excluded immigrants have a moral permission to form enclaves, since
forming enclaves hinders prejudice-reducing forms of intergroup contact.

The empirical premise in this argument does require some qualification,
but it remains strong overall. In Gordon Allport's original articulation of the
contact hypothesis, he argued that intergroup contact reduces prejudice only
when four conditions are met: contact must be *frequent*, *cooperative*, *institution-
ally scaffolded*, and of *equal status*.[73] The weight of the empirical evidence now
suggests that these are best viewed as mediating conditions that can magnify
or diminish the prejudice-reducing effect of positive intergroup contact, not
as necessary conditions for prejudice reduction.[74] The social environment in
which contact takes place does make a difference to the effectiveness of inter-
group contact, but the relationship between intergroup contact and prejudice
reduction is fairly robust, even outside of experimental settings.[75] There are
also some limits to the contact hypothesis: incidences of negative contact may
increase prejudice, informal practices of resegregation can limit opportunities
for contact outside of experimental conditions, and intergroup contact may
also have a "sedative effect" on collective resistance by disadvantaged social

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69   Pettigrew and Tropp, "A Meta-Analytic Test of Intergroup Contact Theory."

70   Meleady, Seger, and Vermue, "Examining the Role of Positive and Negative Intergroup
      Contact and Anti-Immigrant Prejudice in Brexit"; Schneider, "Anti-Immigrant Attitudes
      in Europe"; Savelkoul et al., "Anti-Muslim Attitudes in the Netherlands"; and McLaren,
      "Anti-Immigrant Prejudice in Europe."

71   Visintin et al., "Intergroup Contact Moderates the Influence of Social Norms on Preju-
      dice"; Andersson and Dehdari, "Workplace Contact and Support for Anti-Immigration
      Parties"; and Savelkoul, Laméris, and Tolsma, "Neighbourhood Ethnic Composition and
      Voting for the Radical Right in the Netherlands."

72   Anderson, *The Imperative of Integration*, 123–27.

73   Allport, *The Nature of Prejudice*.

74   Pettigrew, "Intergroup Contact Theory"; and Pettigrew and Tropp, "A Meta-Analytic Test
      of Intergroup Contact Theory."

75   Lemmer and Wagner, "Can We Really Reduce Ethnic Prejudice Outside the Lab?"

groups.[76] This latter effect is particularly important, as it suggests that there may be a trade-off between collective resistance—which, as we have seen, can be important in preserving self-respect—and intergroup contact. Still, despite these limits, the weight of the empirical evidence does support the broad claim that positive intergroup contact tends to reduce prejudice.

But even if the empirical premise in this argument is sound, it does not show that socially excluded immigrants have a moral duty to participate in integration. There are two reasons to think that even if the empirical premise of this argument is sound, it does not put socially excluded immigrants under a duty to participate in integration.

First is simply that the process of integration remains burdensome for socially excluded immigrants. As I have already argued, the social exclusion that some immigrant minorities face makes the demand that immigrant minorities integrate particularly burdensome for them. Socially excluded immigrants who engage in social integration can expect to be exposed to stigma and hostility in their interactions with nonimmigrants. Integration also requires them to forego the protective benefits that they can get from enclaves in terms of maintaining their self-respect, and this point is only strengthened by the finding that social integration can also have a sedative on collective resistance. If my previous arguments to this effect are correct, then requiring social integration would still seem to impose an unreasonable burden on socially excluded immigrants.[77]

Second is that when social integration is viewed as a tool for prejudice reduction, then this means that its ultimate beneficiaries are socially excluded immigrants themselves. So far, I have treated the putative duty to integrate as a duty that is owed to members of the receiving society. But if we care about integration because its prejudice-reducing effects mean that it promotes relational equality, then the putative duty to integrate is ultimately a duty that is owed to those who are the victims of relational inequality: in this case, socially excluded immigrants themselves. This makes an important difference to the argument for integration; it means that the benefits of social integration are not something that members of the receiving society can demand of socially excluded immigrants. Instead, this conception of the putative duty to integrate puts socially excluded immigrants themselves in the position of being able to decide whether or not to release themselves from this duty. In other words, it is the case both that socially excluded immigrants have good reasons to object

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76 McKeown and Dixon, "The 'Contact Hypothesis'"; Cakal et al., "An Investigation of the Social Identity Model of Collective Action and the 'Sedative' Effect of Intergroup Contact among Black and White Students in South Africa"; and Dixon, Durrheim, and Tredoux, "Beyond the Optimal Contact Strategy."

77 See Shelby, *Dark Ghettos*, 73–76.

to being required to participate in social integration and that their participation is not something that is ultimately owed to members of the receiving society.

Where does this leave us with respect to social integration? It may well be that without integration, a society of equals will remain only an ideal that cannot be fully realized. But at the same time, it may be unreasonably burdensome to require that socially excluded immigrant minorities participate in integration. Social exclusion both makes it the case that immigrant minorities have only limited moral duties to participate in integration and at the same time makes integration all the more important. This is ultimately why my defense of enclaves for the excluded is a pessimistic one. On this view, it is better from the point of view of relational equality if socially excluded immigrants participate in integration, but their participation in integration is supererogatory. This suggests that instead of treating integration as an expectation, we should treat it as an aspiration. The fact that many socially excluded immigrants do participate in integration, despite their lack of a duty to do so, should be a cause for celebration. But it is not something that can be reasonably required of them.

4. CONCLUSION

Immigrants are typically expected to participate in social integration in their receiving societies. But some immigrant minorities are subject to this expectation while at the same time being placed in an inferior social position in a pervasive hierarchy of esteem. In this paper, I have argued that those in this position—socially excluded immigrant minorities—have a moral permission to form enclaves, which means that they have only limited duties to participate in social integration. Positively, enclaves can have a protective function against the threats to self-respect involved in social exclusion. Negatively, social exclusion makes the putative duty to integrate unreasonably burdensome. And further, social integration cannot be justified as a social expectation because members of dominant majority groups lack the standing to blame socially excluded immigrant minorities for failures to integrate.

However, it is true that social integration is an important tool for combatting relational inequality. This makes my argument a pessimistic one: social exclusion both makes it the case that socially excluded immigrant minorities have only limited duties to participate in integration and makes it all the more important that they do so, if we are to achieve relational equality. We may hope that socially excluded immigrants integrate, and the fact that many do so may be a cause for celebration. But the integration of socially excluded immigrant minorities is not something that we can legitimately expect, and when socially

excluded immigrants do participate in integration, they are doing something supererogatory.

One attractive feature of this defense of enclaves is that it is *asymmetric*: it applies only to members of socially excluded groups and not to members of social groups who do not face social exclusion. These features of my account enable it to avoid yielding implausible judgments about other cases of enclave formation that do not meet these conditions. Consider, for example, affluent white Americans who cluster together in gated communities. Geographers and sociologists have pointed out that despite being facially neutral, gated communities enable affluent white Americans to engage in social closure by excluding minority groups.[78] This kind of enclave formation cannot be justified by my defense of enclaves. Because affluent white Americans do not face social exclusion, they do not have a justification for engaging in enclave formation on the basis of self-respect. My argument thus avoids the implausible conclusion that members of dominant majority groups have a moral permission to form enclaves.

One upshot of my argument is that debates about immigrant integration should be much more focused on the duties of members of receiving societies than on the duties of immigrants. It suggests that the onus is on members of dominant social groups who uphold hierarchies of esteem that put some immigrants in an inferior social position to change their behaviors. It is only when immigrant minorities do not face social exclusion that they can be held to the expectation that they should participate in social integration.[79]

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