Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 2021-11-18T21:15:55+00:00 Rachel Keith Open Journal Systems <p>The&nbsp;<em>Journal of Ethics and&nbsp;Social Philosophy</em>&nbsp;is a peer-reviewed online journal in moral, social, political, and legal philosophy. The journal welcomes submissions of articles in any of these and related fields of research. &nbsp;The journal is interested in work in the history of ethics that bears directly on topics of contemporary interest, but does not consider articles of purely historical interest.</p> <p>The <em>Journal of Ethics and&nbsp;Social Philosophy</em> aspires to be the leading venue for the best new work in the fields that it covers, and applies a correspondingly high editorial standard. &nbsp;But it is the view of the associate editors that this standard does not preclude publishing work that is critical in nature, provided that it is constructive, well-argued, current, and of sufficiently general interest.</p> <p>While the&nbsp;<em>Journal of Ethics and&nbsp;Social Philosophy</em>&nbsp;will consider longer articles, in general the journal would prefer articles that do not exceed 15,000 words, and articles of all lengths will be evaluated in terms of what they accomplish in proportion to their length. Articles under 3k words should be submitted as discussion notes, which are reviewed and published separately from main articles. &nbsp;</p> Overriding Adolescent Refusals of Treatment 2020-07-29T02:00:22+00:00 Anthony Skelton Lisa Forsberg Isra Black <p>Adolescents are routinely treated differently to adults, even when they possess similar&nbsp;capacities. In this article, we explore the justification for one case of differential&nbsp;treatment of adolescents. We attempt to make philosophical sense of the concurrent&nbsp;consents doctrine in law: adolescents found to have decision-making capacity have the&nbsp;power to consent to—and thereby, all else being equal, permit—their own medical&nbsp;treatment, but they lack the power always to refuse treatment and so render it&nbsp;impermissible. Other parties, that is, individuals who exercise parental responsibility or&nbsp;a court, retain the authority to consent on an adolescent’s behalf. We explore four&nbsp;defences of the doctrine. We reject two attempts to defend the asymmetry in the power&nbsp;to consent to and refuse medical treatment by reference to transitional paternalism. We&nbsp;then consider and reject a stage of life justification. Finally, we articulate a justification&nbsp;based on the distinctiveness of adolescent well-being.</p> 2021-11-18T00:00:00+00:00 Copyright (c) 2021 Anthony, Lisa , Isra Religious Reasoning in the Liberal Public from the Second-Personal Perspective 2020-11-16T02:27:32+00:00 Patrick Zoll <p>There is a constant dissent between exclusivist public reason liberals and their inclusivist religious critics concerning the question whether religious arguments can figure into the public justification of state action.&nbsp;</p> <p>Firstly, I claim that the stability of this dissent is best explained as a conflict between an exclusivist third-personal account of public justification which demands restraint, and an inclusivist first-personal account which rejects restraint.</p> <p>Secondly, I argue that both conceptions are deficient because they cannot accommodate the valid intuitions of their opponents. They either imply a violation of the integrity of religious citizens or they give room for cases where a religious majority can impose a political norm on a minority without having given this minority a reason to comply with the norm.</p> <p>Finally, I defend an inclusivist model of public reason liberalism which relies on a second-personal conception of public justification. I claim that this model breaks the impasse in favor of inclusivism because religious arguments can play a role in public justification, but they can never justify state action on their own in a plural society. Thus, the problematic cases that motivate exclusivism are excluded without having introduced a principle of restraint which violates the religious integrity of citizens.</p> 2021-11-18T00:00:00+00:00 Copyright (c) 2021 Patrick Disagreement, Unilateral Judgment, and Kant’s Argument for Rule by Law 2020-12-11T16:56:59+00:00 Daniel Koltonski <p>Kant argues that it is only as citizens of a properly constituted state that persons are able to respect one another’s innate right to freedom, for joint subjection to the authority of a state enables them to avoid what Kantians call “the problem of unilateralism”: when I interact with you in a state of nature according to my judgment of right in circumstances of disagreement between us, I implicitly claim that my judgment, and not yours, has authority over us simply because it is mine. But this argument seems vulnerable to a powerful objection: my reason for acting on my judgment of right is not that it is mine but rather that it is, as I believe, correct, and so there is no sense in which I am claiming special authority for that judgment. This paper defends the Kantian problem of unilateralism against this objection and, in so doing, illuminates the feature of the Kantian conception of right that accounts for why, no matter how good and right-loving they might be, persons in a state of nature about right are unable coherently to pursue the aim of acting rightly.</p> 2021-11-18T00:00:00+00:00 Copyright (c) 2021 Daniel Koltonski Nonideal Justice, Fairness, and Affirmative Action 2020-12-09T19:37:05+00:00 Matthew Adams <div> <p class="Standard">I defend affirmative action on the ground that it increases certain people’s ability to exercise their basic liberties, rather than because it rectifies injustice in the narrow context of educational admission procedures. I present this justification using a Rawlsian contractualist framework to forge a “nonideal principle of justice.” Drawing on social science, I argue that this principle supports affirmative-action policies like those in the contemporary U.S., and blocks the objection that such policies are unfair. In closing, I show how my account can be used to refine some features of contemporary affirmative-action policies, and I reflect more generally on the value of nonideal principles of justice for tackling exigent topics.</p> </div> 2021-11-18T00:00:00+00:00 Copyright (c) 2021 Matthew Adams Realism, Metasemantics, and Risk 2020-09-13T09:56:31+00:00 Billy Dunaway <div class="page" title="Page 1"> <div class="layoutArea"> <div class="column"> <p><span style="font-size: 10.000000pt; font-family: 'URWPalladioL';">It is often claimed that realism about normativity entails that it is difficult for us to </span><span style="font-size: 10.000000pt; font-family: 'URWPalladioL'; font-style: italic;">know </span><span style="font-size: 10.000000pt; font-family: 'URWPalladioL';">anything about it. I refine this thought by characterizing realism as a thesis which is committed to explaining a semantic thesis about possible uses of normative language: that normative terms like ‘ought’ are semantically stable, in the sense that the term refers to the same property even if it is used differently. There are independent arguments which show that a realist view, if it is plausible, should entail semantic stability for ‘ought’. In this paper I argue that, if the realist succeeds in explaining semantic stability, the realist view implies that normative beliefs will be at risk of being false, and hence not knowledge. Central to this argument is a phenomenon I call </span><span style="font-size: 10.000000pt; font-family: 'URWPalladioL'; font-style: italic;">meta-semantic risk</span><span style="font-size: 10.000000pt; font-family: 'URWPalladioL';">. I argue that the phenomenon of meta-semantic risk gives rise to a significant dose of normative skepticism for the realist, but it does not entail wholesale skepticism, since the epistemic threats are only contingent, and threatens only precise normative beliefs. I close by sketching two arguments that may show that even this limited form of skepticism counts significantly against the realist view. </span></p> </div> </div> </div> 2021-11-18T00:00:00+00:00 Copyright (c) 2021 Billy Dunaway Moral Fetishism and a Third Desire for What’s Right 2020-09-12T20:05:44+00:00 Nathan Howard <div class="page" title="Page 1"> <div class="section"> <div class="layoutArea"> <div class="column"> <p>A major point of debate about morally good motives concerns an ambiguity in the truism that good and strong-willed people desire to do what is right. This debate is shaped by the assumption that “what’s right” combines in only two ways with “desire,” leading to distinct <em>de dicto</em> and <em>de re</em> readings of the truism. However, a third reading of such expressions is possible, first identified by Janet Fodor, which has gone wholly unappreciated by philosophers in this debate. I identify Fodor’s nonspecific reading of “desire to do what’s right” and briefly discuss its merits.</p> </div> </div> </div> </div> 2021-11-18T00:00:00+00:00 Copyright (c) 2021 Nathan Howard How we can make sense of control-based intuitions for limited access-conceptions of the right to privacy 2020-11-17T21:27:36+00:00 Björn Lundgren <p>Over the years, several counterexamples arguably establish the limits of <em>control</em>-based conceptions of privacy and the right to privacy. Some of these counterexamples focus only on privacy, while the control-based conception of the right to privacy is rejected because of conceptual consistency between privacy and the right to privacy. Yet, these counterexamples do not deny the <em>intuitions</em> of control-based conceptions of the right to privacy. This raises the question whether conceptual consistency is more important than intuitions in determining the right way to conceptualize the right to privacy. This article aims to show how the major alternative to control-based conceptions of the right privacy—that is, <em>limited access</em>—can be modified to make sense of, and provide alternative explanations for, these control-based intuitions.</p> 2021-11-18T00:00:00+00:00 Copyright (c) 2021 Björn Lundgren