Elicitory Structural Power and Agential Power: An Outline and Defense

Abstract

Many theorists assume that social power operates only by way of agents’ intentional actions and their causal influence on outcomes—where causality is understood to imply making a difference. This article challenges all three assumptions. It defends, first, the idea that one can play a causal role even without making a difference; second, a notion of structural power as a species of “elicitory” power, which does not operate by way of one’s intentional actions; and third, a noncausal category of power whereby outcomes obtain without one playing a causal role. Recognizing nondecisive, elicitory and structural, and noncausal categories of power is practically, morally, and evaluatively significant: it serves the purposes of determining how to fulfill our aims; of assigning responsibility and blame; and of critically assessing a society’s normative standing in light of its power structure.