Being Wronged and Understanding Moral Wrongness

Abstract

The aim of this article is to articulate and defend the intuition that the experience of being morally wronged affords one a distinctive understanding of the moral wrongness of what one experiences. In section 1, I clarify and motivate this claim. In section 2, I articulate the distinctive kind of understanding of moral wrongness that I argue is afforded to those who experience being morally wronged. In section 3, I spell out the epistemic ability that is acquired and exercised in the generation of the relevant understanding of moral wrongness. In section 4, I respond to the objection that understanding what it is like to be wronged in the relevant way does not provide one with an understanding that goes beyond the experience itself to the objective wrong-making features of the experienced event. In section 5, I articulate what I call the educational role of the experience of being wronged by showing how the epistemic ability afforded to those who have experienced being wronged in the relevant way can be used to develop morally relevant epistemic abilities in those who have not undergone the relevant experience. Section 6 concludes by drawing the implications of my account for the responsibility of acquiring an understanding of the relevant moral wrongs for those who do not undergo the relevant experiences.